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ABSTRACT. It is often argued that, ethically, resource rents should accrue to all citizens.
Yet, in reality, the rents from exploiting national resources are often concentrated in the
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hands of a few. If resource rents were to be taxed, on the other hand, substantial amounts
of public money could be raised and used to cover the population’s infrastructure needs,
such as access to electricity, water, sanitation, communication technology and roads,
which all play important roles in a nation’s economic development process. Here, the
authors examine to what extent existing resource rents could be used to provide universal
access to these infrastructures.
1. Introduction
Access to basic infrastructure services – including water, sanitation, elec-
tricity, transport and telecommunications – is a fundamental underpinning
of human development, understood as creating the capabilities for indi-
viduals to achieve their personal objectives (Dre`ze and Sen, 2013). Even
though investments in the respective infrastructures are likely to yield large
returns (Calderon and Serven, 2014), in the absence of stable institutions
and without access to capital markets it is unlikely that these public goods
will be provided at the socially desirable level (Estache and Fay, 2007). As a
result, infrastructure access gaps – especially within the developing world
– are still high (see section 3.1 for details).
In this study, we argue that resource rent taxation constitutes a promis-
ing option to finance basic infrastructure, at least as part of the required
investments to close these gaps, on two accounts. First, taxes on fixed fac-
tors, such as natural resources, constitute an efficient, distortion-free source
of taxation, as the associated rent is simply transferred from the own-
ers without influencing their incentives (Garnaut, 2010; Mattauch et al.,
2013). Furthermore, current tax revenues are insufficient to meet infras-
tructure investment needs in many developing countries, and possibilities
to raise existing taxes or introduce new taxes remain severely restricted
by institutional constraints, such as lack of administrative capacity and a
large informal sector. For instance, many African countries’ tax revenues
fall short of infrastructure investment requirements. In Nigeria these costs
exceed tax revenue by a factor of 12, in Ethiopia by 20, and in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo by almost 26 (World Bank, 2014). Hence, resource
rent taxation is an attractive option from a theoretical perspective.1 In addi-
tion, resource taxes are less prone to tax evasion (Markandya et al., 2013).
Second, from an ethical point of view, it has been argued that natural
resources should belong to the whole society (Pogge, 2007). From this per-
spective, investing resource rents into public infrastructure, the benefits of
which accrue to all citizens, can be regarded as highly equitable. In addi-
tion, it might be difficult for individuals to pool their resource dividends in
order to realize large-scale infrastructure projects. Resource rent estimates
by the World Bank (2014) exceed 3 trillion US$ for 2010. Even though some
1 Barma et al. (2012) state that even though taxing resources requires less effort
than taxing other economic activities, and thus could provide considerable
rents at relative administrative ease, to date many resource-dependent coun-
tries neglect revenue administration capacity development, which could increase
public revenues.
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X16000139
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universitaetsbibliothek, on 27 Oct 2017 at 08:19:58, subject to the Cambridge Core
Environment and Development Economics 693
of them are already appropriated,2 it is not unlikely that the remainder
could cover at least some of the gaps in access to infrastructure across the
globe.
2. Literature review and contribution
This paper contributes to three different strands of literature. First, it fol-
lows previous studies estimating infrastructure investment needs. In the
literature, the prevalent method uses future GDP projections to extrapolate
empirically the observed relationship between investment and GDP (e.g.,
Estache, 2010; Kohli and Basil, 2011). By contrast, relatively few contribu-
tions examine investment needs to achieve specific human development
goals in terms of access to infrastructure services, such as either the ones
specified in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), or universal
access. Notable exceptions that constitute the basis for the cost estimates
used in this paper include Pachauri et al. (2013) for electricity and Hutton
(2012) for water and sanitation.
Secondly, our paper draws on the literature on taxation and management
of natural resource rents. Henry George (1879) and Feldstein (1977), as well
as Arnott and Stiglitz (1979) examined the conditions under which taxation
of fixed factors of production (such as land) has distortive impacts. More
recently, Edenhofer et al. (2013) have identified conditions under which
resource rent taxation can even raise social welfare by correcting overin-
vestment in fixed factors of production. Furthermore, the management of
resource rents is addressed by a vast literature on the so-called ‘natural
resource curse’ (see van der Ploeg, 2011, for a review), which empha-
sizes the important role of institutions and targeted investment of resource
revenues for natural resource wealth to result in welfare improvements.
Thirdly, our paper is related to the sustainable development literature.
Carrying out a thought experiment in which resource rents are entirely
invested in public infrastructure, it (at least roughly) exemplifies the
Hartwick (1977) rule, which states that use of exhaustible resources can
only go hand in hand with sustained economic activity if the proceeds are
used to build up a capital stock that substitutes for the foregone ‘natural
capital’ (Hamilton and Clemens, 1999; Arrow et al., 2004). This approach
embodies the concept of ‘weak sustainability’, which assumes that con-
structed capital can substitute for natural capital (Neumayer, 2010). The
issue of using rent taxation to finance public infrastructure is examined in
a theoretical framework by Mattauch et al. (2013), who illustrate how taxing
fixed factors eliminates the tradeoff between public good provision and the
disadvantages of distortionary taxation. Furthermore, insofar as providing
access to infrastructure also expands the capability of individuals and their
opportunities, the insights from this paper are also interesting for the com-
munity employing the so-called ‘capability approach’ to development first
put forward by Sen (1992, 1999).
2 See, for example, Land (2008), who finds a range of 0–75 per cent of resource
rents to be already appropriated, with most of the resources featuring rent
appropriation rates around 20 per cent; see also section 4.
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Our paper is, to our knowledge, the first to examine the empirical
relevance of using the revenues from taxes on resource rents in order
to promote human development by means of providing access to basic
infrastructure services, such as water, sanitation, electricity, transport and
telecommunications. A seminal contribution combining resource rent tax-
ation and alleviation of income poverty is by Segal (2010), who highlights
that full redistribution of resource rents could reduce the global number of
people living on less than US$1 a day by up to two-thirds.3 An additional
contribution is that we provide a newly compiled data set, based on differ-
ent sources and our own assumptions and calculations, for the comparison
of infrastructure gaps and the cost of closing them, which we additionally
merge with an extrapolation of resource rents from the World Development
Indicators (WDI) (World Bank, 2014).
3. Methodology and data
In section 3.1 we describe the data used to estimate the gaps in access to
the different types of infrastructure we chose to focus on; section 3.2 intro-
duces the costs to close access gaps. For the computation of the resource
rents, we rely on the most comprehensive and up-to-date data set available
under the WDI (World Bank, 2014). Section 3.3 outlines the information on
resource rents contained in this data set and the major assumptions that
have been made for this study, while a full ready-to-use spreadsheet with
all inputs and outputs can be found in the supplementary materials avail-
able at http://journals.cambridge.org/EDE. This database also contains
the infrastructure costs, which are presented in the second subsection and
which are based on different data sources, sometimes combined in order to
increase coverage and/or precision.
3.1. Access to infrastructure
The goal of this study is to determine whether resource rents would be suf-
ficient to cover investments to such an extent that it would enable universal
(i.e., 100 per cent) access for the respective countries’ populations to five
types of infrastructure which are agreed to be essential in the development
process: water, sanitation, electricity, roads, and information and commu-
nication technology (ICT). The World Bank defines access to improved
drinking water sources as the provision of piped water on premises (piped
household water connection located inside the user’s dwelling, plot or
yard), and as other improved drinking water sources (public taps or stand-
pipes, tube wells or boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs and
rainwater collection). In the case of sanitation, access refers to the avail-
ability for use of flush/pour flush (to piped sewer systems, septic tanks or
pit latrines), ventilated improved pit latrine, pit latrine with slab, and com-
posting toilet facilities. Access to electricity is defined as the percentage
3 Note that Segal’s (2010) approach is related to Pogge’s (2007) ‘Global resource
dividend’. Yet, whereas Pogge (2007) argues for global redistribution of resource
rents, Segal (2010) considers the arguably more realistic case of redistribution at
national level.
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X16000139
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universitaetsbibliothek, on 27 Oct 2017 at 08:19:58, subject to the Cambridge Core
Environment and Development Economics 695
of households with an electricity connection (Pachauri et al., 2013). For
telecommunications, we assume that access is enabled by having a mobile
phone and 10 minutes of airtime per day (ITU, 2014). For transportation, we
do not determine the population shares having access to roads, due to lack
of data, but take the length of unpaved roads as a proxy for the demand for
(paved) roads (World Bank, 2014).
For our analysis, we first determine the current share of people with
access to those infrastructures. These shares are then assumed to remain
constant until 2030, except for electricity access, where future access gaps
are implicit in the cost of closing the gaps. We do not assume that people
can obtain access through, for example, an exogenous increase in income.4
Multiplying these shares by the UN population forecast for 2030 (UN, 2013,
medium fertility scenario), we obtain the total number of people who have
to be connected until the target year, i.e., people who currently do not have
access and the people additionally born into this non-access situation up to
2030.
Figure 1 (which can be seen in colour in the online appendix available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X16000139) displays in five panels the
access maps for the different infrastructure types.5 Note again that in the
absence of a coherent data set on populations’ access to roads, we resorted
to using unpaved roads as a proxy for the demand for paved roads. We
thus implicitly assume that if a transportation channel is needed, then it
exists already as an unpaved road. Clearly, not all roads might carry the
same return, e.g., in terms of connecting people to markets once paved.
Nevertheless, this proxy should enable us to make an estimate of the costs
of satisfying road demand that will not underestimate the resource rent
shares needed to pave the roads for transport.
Figure 1 clearly shows that, globally, access gaps are lowest for water,
whereas lack of access is more pronounced for sanitation, electricity and
telecommunications. In terms of paving unpaved roads, the ‘gaps’ appear
to be largest in parts of Africa and Latin America, even though the amount
of grey countries indicates that data availability prevents us from giving a
more comprehensive picture here.
Gaps for all infrastructures are most severe for Africa. For instance,
in many African countries more than half of the population lacks access
to electricity, sanitation and communication technology. Other ‘hotspots’
include South Asia, with severe access gaps for sanitation and telecommu-
nications, and some countries in Southeast Asia.
4 We realize that this is a conservative assumption, as indeed it can be observed
that increased GDP is positively correlated with improved access (Pachauri et al.,
2013). However, in this study we strictly focus on all investment needed to close
the existing gaps for our calculations of the needed resource rent shares. Thus,
our estimates can be regarded as an upper bound of resource shares needed with
potential downwards as incomes rise.
5 In the supplementary material, we offer a different visualization based on bar
graphs, which enables a more precise comparison of the magnitudes of the access
gaps.
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Figure 1. Share of population without access to: (a) water, (b) sanitation, (c) electricity, and (d) telecommunications. Panel (e) shows the share of
unpaved roads in total roads. Countries with missing data are shaded in grey; white areas show countries with 100 per cent access
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Table 1. Total costs of closing access gaps in millions of 2010 US$
Electricity Water Sanitation ICT Roads Total
East Asia &
Pacific
13,914 92,908 87,480 512,576 2,332,130 3,039,008
Europe &
Central
Asia
0 5,655 12,344 105,825 333,100 456,924
Latin
America &
Caribbean
13,935 29,868 41,257 130,846 2,215,966 2,431,872
Middle East
& North
Africa
4,598 17,891 13,312 49,486 135,604 220,890
North
America
0 0 0 3,419 0 3,419
South Asia 35,861 5,044 105,213 1,062,650 2,488,990 3,697,759
Sub-Saharan
Africa
351,251 36,752 150,811 672,436 256,733 1,467,983
Total 419,559 188,118 410,418 2,537,238 7,762,522 11,317,856
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on UN population forecasts (UN,
2013), WDI database on population shares without access (World Bank, 2014)
and costs from different sources: Hutton (2012) for water and sanitation,
Pachauri et al. (2013) for electricity, IEA (2013) for roads and ITU (2014) for
mobile connections.
3.2. Infrastructure costs
Table 1 shows the total cost of providing access to the respective popula-
tions without access in the main regions of the world (see also figures 1
and 2). These are the aggregated numbers of the inputs (at country level)
that were used to compute the cost ratios for closing the access gaps, which
will be presented in the next section. Clearly, the costs of giving access to
water appear to be among the lowest, as both the population lacking access
is low (see also figure 1) and construction and recurrent costs are much
less compared to, e.g., electricity. This leads us to expect that most regions
will be able to use their resource rents to finance investment into universal
water access.
3.2.1. Water and sanitation
For the cost estimate of enabling universal access to clean water and sani-
tation, we rely on the World Health Organization (WHO) study by Hutton
(2012). He provides cost data for water and sanitation in both rural and
urban areas, and computes the total costs for two targets: the MDGs and
universal access (and the corresponding benefits). In this study, we abstain
from making assumptions about benefits, a comprehensive estimation of
which would be beyond the scope of our objectives.
For the final results, a number of assumptions are first needed – starting
with the problem that Hutton (2012) uses the MDG regions, which are
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Figure 2. Natural resource rents from forests, oil, gas, coal and minerals, extrapolated
until 2030 based on WDI data. Rents were summed over the 15-year period from 2015
to 2030, and are represented per capita based on the estimated population in 2030.
White areas have no rents; grey areas have no data available
different from the WDI regions that the resource rent numbers are based
on. Therefore, all countries with unclear membership were reassigned to
regions based on their location. The country-level data have then been
aligned with our population data for 2030 (see also section 3.1), as Hutton
(2012) uses different forecasts. These forecasts were not dramatically dif-
ferent and using Hutton’s (2012) population data would not have changed
our results significantly, yet for reasons of consistency and comparability
with the other infrastructure types and precision of the final cost ratios,
we transformed the numbers according to the population shares without
access derived in section 3.1.
Where no data were available at country level, the regional average was
computed using table A6 in Hutton (2012), and then broken down to US$
per person per country.
Costs in Hutton (2012) are available for urban and rural areas. We used
the sum of both for reasons of comparability with the other infrastructure
types.7
6 Table A (Hutton, 2012: 7) on total financial capital costs to expand coverage to
achieve MDG targets and attain universal access for improved drinking water
sources and sanitation, from 2011 to 2015.
7 In the database, the cost share of urban versus rural is given, so the difference
could be deducted for each region if needed for more detailed analysis in the
future.
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Recurrent costs for water in Hutton (2012) are given as a percentage of
total costs for the MDGs. The aggregate numbers are US$13bn for sanita-
tion and US$3bn for water from 2010 until 2015, including operations and
maintenance (O&M) costs. This amounts to 1.86 per cent of total costs for
water (i.e., global recurrent cost) and 8.08 per cent for sanitation, both over
five years. Extrapolating to 15 years, we assume an average of 7.5 years of
recurrent costs, but test for higher costs in section 5. Note that these cal-
culations are for the MDG goals. In order to calculate the total costs for
universal access we used the same cost shares and arrive at higher total
costs. The same procedure was used for sanitation.
The total cost displayed in table 1 for water and sanitation is the sum of
recurrent costs and the sum of urban and rural construction costs, which is
later divided by the resource rents to arrive at the results in section 4.
3.2.2. Electricity
For electricity access, a thorough literature review (see also the compari-
son of studies by Rothman et al., 2014) led us to the conclusion that cost
estimates vary vastly, e.g., from US$1,500 per kW (Fay, 2001, using 1995
US$) to US$4,000 per kW (Kohli and Basil, 2011, using 2009 US$) for Latin
America, and around US$1,900 (Fay and Yepes, 2003, using 1995 US$) and
US$1,500 (Hughes et al., 2010, using 2009 US$) globally. This is partially
due to the fact that definitions of access vary, where some studies require
just a connection while others also integrate the provision of a minimum
amount of electricity into final cost numbers. For reasons of consistency
and because most of the numbers in the literature were regional or even
global averages not taking into account heterogeneity between regions, cost
projections from an energy systems model (Pachauri et al., 2013) have been
taken as the basis for our calculation.
The advantage of using model estimates for access costs is that we can
look much more deeply into the details behind the numbers than is possible
with the global averages from the literature, as in this way the technologies
specific to, and feasible for, the regions in question have been employed,
thus taking into account heterogeneity in energy supply potentials, pop-
ulation density, access to technology and their impact on final costs to
consumers. The costs are given in table 2. Note that they explicitly consider
not only the cost of installing the capacity, but also the cost of provid-
ing a minimum amount of electricity to each household to cover basic
demands, which is contained in the O&M costs.8 Also, in contrast to what
has been assumed for the other infrastructure types, the model results take
into account the fact that higher incomes can translate to a certain degree
to higher access rates as well. We can therefore expect the results to be
somewhat less conservative than the ones for water and sanitation.
In the study by Pachauri et al. (2013), cost data are calculated for three
regions: South Asia (SAS), Pacific East Asia (PAS) and Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA). Reassigning countries to fit WDI regions, we assumed that the
8 Note that O&M costs have been adjusted to 15 years; in Pachauri et al. (2013) the
time horizon is 25 years.
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Table 2. Unit costs (in current US$) for achieving universal electricity access
from 2005 until 2030 and costs per connection based on calculations by
MESSAGE-ACCESS
Unit South Asia Pacific Asia Africa
Grid investment US$bn 39.7 9.6 193.2
Generation investment US$bn 2.3 1.2 2.9
O&M (incl. fuel) US$bn 2.6 1.3 5.5
Total cost US$bn 44.6 12.1 201.6
Pop connected million 669 71 605
Grid cost per conn US$/capita 59 134 319
Total cost per conn US$/capita 67 170 333
Source: Pachauri et al. (2013) and van Ruijven et al. (2012).
Middle East has costs in the range of PAS, which is in line with num-
bers given in Crousillat et al. (2010), where universal access by 2030 for
the Middle East is estimated to cost 2010 US$3bn (but starting in 2008
and not in 2015, as in our study). Egypt and Morocco in Northern Africa,
Central Asia and the whole of East Asia and the Pacific are assigned the
cost of PAS as well. SSA costs have been applied to Latin America and
the Caribbean and Algeria, Djibouti, Libya and Tunisia. Europe has virtu-
ally no gaps in electricity access. All these assignments have been made
mainly by looking at properties such as population density and geograph-
ical factors. For countries with missing data, regional averages have been
assigned.
The split between the urban and rural population could have been taken
from the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) database, but for total costs,
only the rural costs are given in Pachauri et al. (2013), which is why we also
use the same numbers for the urban areas, thus neglecting cost-reducing
factors such as economies of scale. The costs used can thus be regarded as
conservative estimates.
3.2.3. Roads
For roads, the WDI contains the total road network at country level in kilo-
metres, and also give the percentage of the network that is paved. We use
the length of unpaved roads as a proxy for the demand for paved roads,
assuming that these unpaved roads have emerged in response to a need
for transportation and connectivity at the location in question.9
Concerning the costs of paving these unpaved roads, we use the Inter-
national Energy Agency’s (IEA) report (IEA, 2013, Table 6). Again, the
definition of regions is different from the WDI database, so a reassignment
similar to the one described in section 3.2.1 has been conducted. For
9 A more in-depth analysis would use geographical methods in order to derive
the number of people that would gain access to, for example, markets due to
improved road quality, but this is beyond the scope of our study.
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example, the IEA data do not contain Northern Africa as a separate region
so the African numbers have been matched to WDI; the same applies to the
Caribbean. The assignments of countries to WDI regions can be reviewed
in the supplementary material.
Recurrent costs and O&M costs are separated in the data used, and only
O&M is included (no reconstruction), as we presume that reconstruction is
only required after the 15-year horizon that we consider for the build-up of
the infrastructure, and we take the reconstruction of existing roads as being
part of the ‘business-as-usual’ scenario instead of being additional. Again,
these costs are averaged over a 15-year period. The reason for this assump-
tion is that we want to focus on enabling universal access to infrastructure
by 2030, and it is not the objective of this study to include reconstruc-
tion beyond that horizon, as otherwise we would also have to include the
rebuilding costs of countries which already have full access today. The total
costs in table 1 are therefore the sum of the (initial) construction costs and
the average O&M costs until 2030.
3.2.4. ICT
For communications, we chose to use the maximum of the share of popu-
lation with access to fixed lines and mobile connections, respectively. The
percentage of the population per country with access to mobile and fixed
connections for 2010 (or the latest number that was available for a spe-
cific country) has been taken from ITU (2014).10 This has been used to
compute the amount of people without access in 2030, again based on the
medium fertility population forecast by the UN (2013). For countries with
missing data, the regional average has been assigned. We assume that all
new connections are mobile phones, as this is the more common form cur-
rently proliferating in the emerging countries rather than fixed lines and
broadband (Aker and Mbiti, 2010).
In order to make a conservative assumption in the absence of any con-
sistent data, the cost for providing access to mobile connections is assumed
to be US$150 in fixed costs per connection. This is in line with the range
over different studies surveyed by Rothman et al. (2014). For the cost of
usage, we assume 2 cents per minute. For an airtime of 10 minutes over 15
years (again averaging), usage cost thus amounts to US$547.50. For recur-
rent cost, 8 per cent of total costs is spread over 7.5 years. Total costs are the
sum of fixed costs, usage costs and recurrent costs multiplied by the total
population without access in 2030.
3.3. Resource rents
Resource rents, as quoted in the WDI, come from the World Bank (2011)
publication, The Changing Wealth of Nations.11 Natural resource rents are
10 Where available, data have been taken from 2011, otherwise the assumption is
that access does not decrease as we move forward in time.
11 Note that The Changing Wealth of Nations covers the period from 1995 until 2008,
but resource rents are updated annually in the Wealth Accounting Database,
enabling us to cover a period until 2013.
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calculated from forests, oil, gas, coal and minerals. The latter include baux-
ite, copper, lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, zinc, gold, silver and iron. In
particular, these estimates are computed as the difference between the price
of a commodity and the average cost of producing it. This is done by esti-
mating the world price of units of specific commodities and subtracting
estimates of average unit costs of extraction or harvesting costs (including
a standard return on capital). These unit rents are then multiplied by the
physical quantities that countries extract or harvest to determine the rents
for each commodity as a share of gross domestic product (GDP). The data
used in this study are given in percentages of 2010 GDP. A total of 214 coun-
tries are included in the data set; however, 25 countries lack data. These 25
countries can mostly be classified as either small and resource poor, or as
having 100 per cent access already.
In order to estimate the amount of resource rents that would, in princi-
ple, be available to finance infrastructure investments to close the access
gaps described above until 2030, we assume that resource extraction
rates and prices remain constant in absolute terms, thus abstaining from
any judgement as to the likelihood of peak production or major tech-
nological breakthroughs that could decrease costs in the coming decade.
We feel that this is a sufficiently conservative assumption to arrive at a
robust benchmark for our estimates, and will later test these by intro-
ducing some sensitivity analyses (see section 5). Figure 2 (available in
colour in the online appendix) displays the resource rents available at
constant extraction rates and prices in 2010 US$ across the globe. On
the basis of figures 1 and 2, it appears to be justified to assume that
there should be a good chance that resource rents could cover access
gaps in Latin America and Asia. Only Africa appears to have a larger
share of countries at the lower end of both access and resource rent
availability.
As mentioned before, parts of the resource rents are obviously already
being appropriated by governments or private stakeholders, and it is
questionable how much additional financing could practically be made
available during the foreseen time horizon. Coming up with a compre-
hensive review of current levels of resource rent taxation is beyond the
scope of this study and would actually be a stand-alone project in itself.
However, for countries that need only a small share of their resource rents
to finance their infrastructure goals, it should be feasible to meet them
by resource rent taxation, and we conduct a sensitivity analysis halving
the amount of rents that can be appropriated and doubling the costs of
doing so.
4. Results
The extent to which existing gaps in terms of infrastructure access could
be covered by resource rents is displayed in figure 3 (available in colour
in the online appendix). For water (panel (a)), for almost all countries uni-
versal access could be provided at a comparatively low share (about 10
per cent) of annual resource rents. This observation is explained by the fact
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X16000139
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universitaetsbibliothek, on 27 Oct 2017 at 08:19:58, subject to the Cambridge Core
E
nvironm
entand
D
evelopm
entE
conom
ics
703
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
Figure 3. Share of total resource rents required to finance universal access to: (a) water, (b) sanitation, (c) electricity, (d) telecommunications, and
(e) transport (scale is logarithmic)
term
s of use, available at https://w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core/term
s. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X16000139
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core. U
niversitaetsbibliothek, on 27 O
ct 2017 at 08:19:58, subject to the C
am
bridge C
ore
704 Sabine Fuss et al.
that: (i) in most regions the access gap for water is lower than for other
infrastructures (see figure 1, panel (a)); and (ii) the costs of providing water
access are comparatively low (see also section 3.3). Note that white-shaded
areas are those where the share of resource rents required to achieve uni-
versal access is close to zero (i.e., areas that already enjoy almost universal
access), whereas grey areas indicate that no data on access gaps or costs are
available.
For sanitation (panel (b)), universal access for most of Latin America
and Asia could be achieved at 10 per cent or less of annual resource
rents. For Africa, on the other hand, requirements are significantly higher,
ranging from 10 to 20 per cent for most countries. Nevertheless, resource
rents would be sufficient to provide universal access to sanitation for all
countries included in our analysis.
For electricity (panel (c)), establishing universal access would require a
rather small share of less than 10 per cent of resource rents for most Latin
American and Asian countries. For Africa, however, more than half of the
resource rents would be required for some countries, and for a small subset
of countries it would be infeasible to achieve universal access in the time
period under consideration (2015–2030), even if the entire resource rents
were invested solely into electricity infrastructure. These include Eritrea,
Aruba, Kiribati, Micronesia, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, East
Timor, Niger and Malawi. The fact that providing electricity for some
African countries is found to be rather challenging can be explained by
lower access, as well as by the lower population density, which imposes
higher costs on building transmission grids. Note that the data do not allow
us to look into possibilities of decentralized power solutions for remote
areas at this stage. This would be an interesting extension to consider
for future research, which would also enable a more detailed analysis of
countries without access cost data, such as small island states.
For telecommunications (panel (d)), resource rents would be insufficient
to finance universal access in almost one-third of the African countries
included in our sample, as well as for some Asian countries. In addition, for
several countries in which investment needs do not exceed resource rents,
they would nevertheless account for a large portion of the rents. Given that
some part of the resource rents would either be needed for investment in
water, sanitation, electricity and roads, or might already be appropriated
by the state, these observations suggest that the potential for achieving
universal access to telecommunications may face a limited potential. On
the other hand, however, the cost assumptions of our analysis are rather
conservative, and it is conceivable that technological developments could
result in cost reductions that would make access to telecommunications
significantly less expensive than what our assumptions imply.
Finally, for roads (panel (e)), our results suggest that investment needs
to pave all currently unpaved roads in the period 2015–2030 would exceed
the resource rents of many countries in our sample, and consume a
considerable fraction of resource rents (>30 per cent) for others.
Note that the relatively high resource rent shares for more developed
countries such as Japan and South Korea should not come as a surprise.
Despite high access rates in these countries, scarce resource endowments
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mean that a relatively large share of rents would be needed to close
remaining access gaps.
In summary, our results indicate that resource rent taxation could be
likely to provide the means to finance access to the infrastructures directly
necessary for subsistence, i.e., to water, electricity and sanitation. Yet, for
many countries it would not be sufficient to cover more advanced needs,
including requirements for telecommunications and paved roads.
In the next section, we will assess the robustness of our results by testing
for the impact of higher and lower costs of access provision and resource
rents.
5. Sensitivity analysis
Resource rents could change over time due to changes in demand, changes
in the quality of the commodity, or special trade agreements, for example.
Also, the estimates of unit costs of extraction could differ as they depend on
the available technology. We therefore test for the case where resource rents
are 50 per cent lower than in the baseline results presented in section 5. This
is not unreasonable, looking at, for example, recent falls in the price of oil,
even if this might be just a short- or medium-term phenomenon. In addi-
tion, it is a good way of testing the robustness of results in the face of the
fact that parts of resource rents are already appropriated (see section 6 for
a discussion). Likewise, technological breakthroughs and price hikes could
lead to higher resource rents. Therefore, we will also test the case where
resource rents are 50 per cent higher. Note that we are not putting forward
any claims for the realism of these scenarios here. The main purpose is to
test our results along the full spectrum of outcomes, setting two extreme
cases between which most of the deviations occurring in reality should be
located.
Similarly, we match a 50 per cent higher access cost scenario to the case of
higher resource rents, and a 50 per cent more expensive scenario to the case
with lower resource rents. In this way, we arrive at the range of sensitivities
presented in figure 4. The deviations in costs could originate from changes
in labour and material costs, but also from deviations in discount rates, etc.
They will probably not be as high as 50 per cent in reality, but by using such
an extreme range we can be confident that we cover all possibilities over
which we want our results to be robust.
In figure 4, lower and upper ends of whiskers represent the extreme cases
described above.12 Evidently, water access is the most easily covered gap.
Even in the least favourable scenario, the share of resource rents required
to close those gaps, is considerably below 4 per cent. The same applies to
East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the
Caribbean, and the Middle East and North Africa for both sanitation and
electricity access. For sanitation, the share can go up to as high as 17 and 12
per cent for South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, respectively. In the case
of electricity, it is the other way round, with the lower share for South
12 For regional averages, only countries for which both costs and rents were
available have been considered in the sensitivity analysis.
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(a)
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(c)
(d)
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Figure 4. Sensitivity analysis results show share of resource rents required to finance
universal access to infrastructure: (a) electricity, (b) water, (c) sanitation, (d) telecom-
munications, and (e) transport
Notes: In the case of Transport, the indicator is not in terms of population shares having
access to roads, but in terms of km of unpaved roads as a proxy for paved road demand.
For further description of data and sources, see section 2. Upper end of whiskers show
the least favourable case with 50 per cent more expensive infrastructure and 50 per cent
less rents, and vice versa for the lower end of the whiskers. Please note different scales.
Asia just above 5 per cent, but Sub-Saharan Africa close to a quarter of
its total resource rents. Given that the other gaps also need to be closed,
Sub-Saharan Africa would struggle to achieve all the goals simultaneously
if costs are considerably higher and resource rents lower. It is important to
bear in mind, however, that this is an extreme scenario and that the actual
number is much more likely to centre somewhere around 8 per cent. The
most variation can finally be observed in panels (d) and (e) in figure 4,
where we display the whisker plots for the ICT and road sensitivity anal-
yses. For mobile connections, Latin America and the Caribbean falls just
short of the 2 per cent threshold for the worst case scenario, and East Asia
and the Pacific is in the least favourable scenario, required to spend about
18 per cent of its resource rents to enable universal access to communi-
cation (via mobile connections). Sub-Saharan Africa would need to spend
more than half of their resource rents on ICT for universal access. In the
case of South Asia, the share actually exceeds 100 per cent, i.e., this region
will not be able to close the gap through the use of its resource rents alone.
For roads, even our central estimate exceeds 100 per cent of resource rents
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for South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the worst case esti-
mate for Latin America would also exceed the available resource rents, and
for East Asia and the Pacific the required share is more than 90 per cent.
6. Resource rent taxation in practice
The previous sections have demonstrated that resource rents could, at
least in theory, provide the financial means to cover infrastructure invest-
ment needs for many countries. As highlighted by the literature on the
‘natural resource curse’ (Sachs and Warner, 1995; van der Ploeg, 2011),
resource-dependent countries are frequently affected by problems related
to institutional quality. As a consequence, collecting taxes on resource rents
and ensuring that they are productively invested requires well-functioning
governance mechanisms (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). For exam-
ple, Caselli and Michaels (2013) examine the effects of resource windfalls
on government behaviour in the Brazilian oil sector. They find that social
transfers, public good provision, infrastructure and household income
increase less than anticipated on the basis of the higher reported spending
by oil-rich municipalities.
Yet recent literature has also shown that there are channels through
which natural resources may have positive effects for development (Led-
erman and Maloney, 2008; Wick and Bulte, 2009). That is, natural resource
wealth has the potential to adversely affect development outcomes. How-
ever, resources are not destiny, but can be used productively by good policy
design.
Another aspect that needs to be considered is the political economy
of resource rent taxation. Arguably, any attempt to appropriate resource
rents would be met by fierce opposition from resource owners. Yet one
could argue that public pressure from a broad spectrum of the popula-
tion who would gain from increased infrastructure access may be sufficient
to more than compensate for the influence of powerful special interest
groups. In view of the negative empirical association between mineral
wealth and democratization (Ross, 2001), ensuring accountability of how
resource rents are used is central in order to ensure buy-in of societal coali-
tions favouring resource rent taxes. Previous experience suggests that the
earmarking of revenues, e.g., for infrastructure, can increase government
accountability (Dhillon and Perroni, 2001) and the political feasibility of
proposed policies (Sclen and Kallbekken, 2011). Hence, dedicating resource
rents to infrastructure investments could provide a mechanism that com-
mits policy makers to using these rents in a predetermined way, and thus
reduce opportunities for embezzlement.
7. Conclusions and discussion
Access to basic infrastructures such as water, sanitation, electricity,
telecommunications and transport is an essential feature of human
wellbeing. For this reason, access considerations play an important role in
existing development policies. In this paper we have argued that, in order
to finance infrastructure investment, resource rent taxation is not only an
economically efficient source of public finance, but can also be defended
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from a normative point of view. We have contributed to the literature by
assembling a consistent database on resource rents, access gaps, and the
costs of closing them, to enable this assessment and further analysis in the
future, which could focus on different aspects of this work.
The strategy of using resource rents to finance infrastructure invest-
ments seems unlikely to work for resource-poor countries with low natural
resource endowments (many of which were excluded from our data set
due to a lack of available data), e.g., small island states. To achieve univer-
sal access to infrastructure services in these countries, alternative funding
sources need to be envisaged. Besides existing traditional channels of
development cooperation, one opportunity to levy additional public rev-
enue consists of imposing a price on greenhouse gas emissions by means
of a tax, or an emissions trading scheme, as analysed by Jakob et al. (2016).
In addition, the extent to which new public revenue can be generated by
resource rent taxation crucially depends on the share of resource rents that
are currently already appropriated by states, either by means of direct tax-
ation, royalties or public ownership. To our knowledge, no consistent data
on the appropriation of resource rents are available. Land (2008) provides
an overview of resource rent capture in selected countries (see Land, 2008,
Table 1), highlighting the large range of 0–75 per cent of rents being appro-
priated, with most estimates around 20 per cent. For the case of hard coal,
the IEA (2014: 57) points out that in non-OECD countries about two-thirds
of reserves (and hence a similar amount of associated rents) are publicly
owned. Analysing capture of oil rents for Australia, Brazil, Canada, Nor-
way, the USA and the UK, Mintz and Chen (2012) find numbers ranging
from negative (i.e., subsidization) to more than half (see Mintz and Chen,
2012, Table 2). Even though these considerations suggest that the availabil-
ity of resource rents to finance infrastructure access may be limited in some
cases, it also indicates that there is a significant potential, especially for
countries and infrastructures for which universal access can be achieved
at the cost of only a few per cent of annual resource rents (see figure 5,
available in colour in the online appendix).
More support for this optimistic conclusion comes from the fact that our
analysis only provides an estimate of the orders of magnitude involved
rather than employing a fully fledged model that takes into account feed-
back effects. Surely the installation of the infrastructure achieving universal
access will have impacts on economic development that will feed back into
rents, e.g., by increasing demand for natural resources. In this way, infras-
tructure could even become self-financing to a certain extent (Gaffney,
2009), which is a feature that the framework of our study does not consider.
Finally, in this study the focus has been on physical infrastructure types,
whereas ‘soft’ or social infrastructure is often put forward as being at least
as important for a country’s development process (Rothman et al., 2014).
Those types of infrastructures, being defined as the social foundations of
society and taking forms such as a legal system or a government (Roth-
man et al., 2014), can be fostered by closing ‘access gaps’ in, for example,
education and improving health services.
Summarizing the results, our study indicates that appropriation of
resource rents could indeed make a large contribution towards closing
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Figure 5. Total share of resource rents needed to simultaneously achieve universal
access to electricity, water, sanitation and communications and to pave all unpaved
roads (scale is logarithmic)
existing access gaps in most parts of the world. Most importantly, with
the view of achieving universal access in the period 2015–2030, the annual
resource rents exceed the investment requirements for water, sanitation
and electricity in practically all the countries under study. Even though
resource rents are insufficient to ensure access to telecommunications and
paved roads in all the countries, and even if the full rents are not available
for appropriation (as some parts of them are already captured), resource
rent taxation can significantly alleviate the financial burden on public
budgets.
Supplementary material and methods
To view supplementary material for this article, please wait http://dx.doi.
org/10.1017/S1355770X16000139.
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